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I. Fighting Religious Wars in 
Sixteenth-century Europe
Early Modern Europe presents historians 
with a multitude of wars, officially declared 
and waged as “religious” (or “crusades”, or 
even in the case of late sixteenth-century 
France, as “holy wars”). Historians’ attention 
has particularly been drawn to scriptural 
justifications for war and some pioneering 
studies have shed light on the divergent and 
conflicting “appropriations of the Scriptures” 
as a rhetoric of legitimisation of warfare.1
The German historian Konrad Repgen has 
suggested that the term “religious war” (Reli-
gionskrieg) can be approached as a typologi-
cal concept, used primarily as a legitimation 
(but not as a motivation) type for a number 
of early modern wars, particularly those of 
the sixteenth century. According to Repgen, 
a war should only be termed “religious” in so 
far as “at least one of the belligerents lays 
claim to “religion”, a religious law, in order to 
justify his warfare and to substantiate pub-
licly why his use of military force against a 
political authority should be a bellum justum”. 
It follows that war legitimations of this type 
were “roughly equal in number to the bel-
ligerents”.2 Repgen concludes his typological 
analysis by arguing that in the sixteenth cen-
tury “the time for crusades against Christians 
was past” as “war was no longer waged and 
justified as a crusade but as a Religionskrieg, 
the military solution to conflicts arising from 
the protection of confessional possessions or 
from confessional conquest”.3 
Following on the steps of Philip Benedict and 
Denis Crouzet,4 among others, this paper 
Costas Gaganakis
Religious Zeal and
Political Expediency
on the Eve of 
the French 
Wars of Religion
University of Athens
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:44:14 |
HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 6 (2006)
135
seeks to question Repgen’s conclusions on two grounds, with reference to the Protestant stand 
on the eve of the French Wars of Religion: Firstly, “religious war” did not only serve as a legitimation 
type for warfare, but it actually emerged as motivation in both rival camps, a product of the mutually 
shared belief that ‘God’s Truth’ was irreconcilable with any other reading of the Gospels and that 
those ‘chosen by God’ carried a divine mandate to fight a total war against the ‘forces of darkness’. 
Secondly, the crusading spirit was more than manifest in the French wars of religion and, although 
construed differently, it motivated decisions and particular types of action in both camps.
II. God’s Truth and the Unity of the Church during the Reformation
The fight for the restoration of the purity of the Gospel ultimately led Luther to a legitimisation of reli-
gious war, despite his rejection of the Catholic theological foundations of the crusade idea. Lutheran 
argumentation in support of religious war was founded on the reformer’s eschatological perception 
of the struggle against the papacy, as well as on a patriotic zeal, equally expressed by Zwingli.5 
In Book IV, chapter 2, of Calvin’s Institution de la religion chrestienne, the unity of human society 
was presented as deriving from the unity of the Church. The latter was conceived as resting 
exclusively on the unadulterated word of God, on the purity of the Christian faith, which could 
not be compromised through theological or other concessions. In Calvin’s mind, the attempts 
at mediation between evangelicals and Catholics, such as those of Sebastian Castellion and 
François Bauduin, could only result in the corruption of the purity of the faith.6
In his refutation of Georg Cassander’s argument that the Catholic and the Evangelical Churches 
were constitutive parts of the true Church of Christ (with the Anabaptists relegated to the rank of 
heretics), Calvin stressed that as the papist Church did not share with evangelical Christians the 
“true essence” of the faith in Christ, it did not constitute part of the true Church. In their deviation 
from the teachings of the founder of Christian religion, the papists had formed their own tyran-
nical and demonic Church which ought to be demolished by God’s faithful.7
It has been argued that Calvin’s theology could be viewed as a systematic confession of Christian 
faith, a theological witness and not a philosophical argument.8 It was Calvin’s declared intention that 
his theology would present the world with the God’s truth and his entire polemic production was 
devoted to the defence it against dangerous fallacies. Calvinist theology and polemic production 
should be viewed as inseparable parts of the same campaign in the service of the purity of the Gos-
pel; moreover, the defence of God’s truth entailed an all-out war against the forces of darkness.9
III. Evangelical Zeal and Political Expediency on the Eve of the French Wars of 
Religion
Proclaimed on 19 April 1561, the royal edict of Fontainebleau expressed the French crown’s 
newly adopted policy of “civil tolerance” (tolérance civile) of religious polyphony. Aimed at check-
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ing the spiralling religious confrontation, the edict ordered both sides to abstain from all acts of 
provocation, forbidding the use of insults such as “papist” or “Huguenot”.10 French Protestants 
tried to take advantage of the change in climate by refraining from acts of provocation such 
as public worship gatherings.11 However, the quest for legitimacy in the consolidation of local 
Protestant communities was undermined by the apostolic zeal of the movement, pressing for 
the total eradication of Catholicism in its zones of control.12
The printed Calvinist production of 1561 reflected this contradiction in priorities, sometimes 
demanding from Catherine de Medici and Charles IX considerably more than a simple recogni-
tion of the right of religious freedom. The pamphlets, which printed demands and protests of 
the Huguenots, called on the royal family to follow the lead of the great reforming monarchs 
of the past, such as the biblical kings Jechu, Ezechias, Josias and the emperors Constantine 
and Theodosius, and “to restore the Lord’s temple, burning the idols of Baal”.13 The Protestants 
presented themselves as God’s chosen, enduring tyranny and oppression but certain of the final 
outcome of the battle, “in accordance to Christ’s prophecy”.14
In June 1561, the Calvinist churches of France formally petitioned the king to grant them freedom 
of religious conscience, to liberate all their imprisoned brethren and to “restrain” the judiciary 
from persecuting the faithful. French Protestants equally asked for the right to hold services in 
their own churches, which could be provided by the crown or built by themselves, as their “grand 
multitude” could not be contained any more in private religious gatherings that were the norm 
in accordance with royal edicts.15 
The need to bridge the religious divide in France led Catherine de Medici and Michel de l’Hospital 
to convoke a theological colloquy between the Calvinists and prelates of the Catholic Church at 
Poissy in September 1561. In their initiative, they had the support of the King of Navarre, who 
had previously been the target of systematic pressure on the part of Calvin in order to openly 
declare himself in favour of the evangelical cause. 
What was truly alarming to Geneva, however, were rumours that the convocation of the col-
loquy had also been approved by the Guise, and that there was a plan to introduce the Lutheran 
confession of Augsburg, the Augustana, particularly in its original version, the Invariata of 1530, 
which, to the Calvinists, amounted to a total submission of the evangelicals to the Catholic per-
version of the true symbolic meaning of the Eucharist.16 Calvin intervened immediately, warning 
the King of Navarre that the introduction of a “German” confession in France would jeopardise 
peace and spread discord. He repeated that warning in letters to Beza and Admiral Coligny, who 
were participating in the colloquy.17
At the colloquy itself,18 the Protestant delegation submitted the Calvinist Confession of Faith 
adopted by the reformed churches of France in 1559 and also made clear in several printed 
declarations that they would only participate in the proceedings on their own terms. These 
were: firstly, that the king or the royal chancellor preside over the conference; secondly, that the 
delegates of the Roman Church come as participants and not as judges; thirdly, that all doctrinal 
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differences should be discussed exclusively with reference to the “word of God”, with the use 
of the Hebrew text for the Old Testament and of the Greek for the New; and finally, that two 
secretaries be appointed on each side to keep a transcript of the proceedings which should be 
subsequently approved and signed by both parties.19
The fate of the colloquy had been sealed before its beginning; both sides had come to pros-
elytise and not to converge.20 On the Protestant side, Calvin sought to minimise the chances 
of a theological compromise with the Catholics by deliberately limiting the mutually accepted 
ecclesiastical tradition (that would serve as common ground to a possible rapprochement) to 
the first two centuries of the Church and not to the first five, as had originally been suggested by 
the moyenneurs. Leading the Protestant delegation, Beza presented himself not as a dissenter 
to the creed and the religious practices of the Catholic Church, open to discussion and possibly 
a compromise, but as the spokesperson of a doctrinally articulate, cohesive and militant Prot-
estantism.21 The Calvinist perception of ecclesiastical unity as well as its Catholic counterpart 
undermined all mediating proposals; despite their differences in rhetoric, they both presupposed 
the proselytisation of the other and the total silencing of religious dissent. Calvinist intransigence 
at the colloquy was further fuelled by the certainty of final victory and the total eradication of 
papist blasphemy from French soil. 
IV. A “Just and Necessary War” (1562–1563)
The mobilisation of Huguenot forces, led by Condé’s attack on Orléans on 2 April 1562,22 was 
followed by a blaze of apologetic tracts that stressed Protestant obedience to the policy of the 
crown (with special emphasis put on the edict of Saint-Germain) and continued to lambast the 
rival “Lorrains”. Condé’s Declaration attempted to sidestep the religious question by focusing on 
the preservation of legality in the kingdom, with respect to the decisions taken by the king with 
the assistance of his council.23 At the same time, the chants of war encouraged Condé’s soldiers, 
presenting them as instruments of divine will and soldiers of a holy alliance, engaged in a “just 
and necessary war”, provoked by Guise aggression.24
The problematic balancing between the crusading zeal of the Protestants and the pursued 
legitimacy of their armed mobilisation was manifest in a text written by the Parisian minister 
Antoine de Chandieu and published in Calvinist Lyon in 1563. Chandieu’s martyrology was partly 
an “internal text” of the movement, in the tradition of Jean Crespin, seeking to encourage the 
faithful during the first war of religion. But it also addressed moderate Catholics in an effort to 
broaden the basis of what was being promoted as an anti-Guise alliance. In this direction, Chan-
dieu’s martyrology went beyond the classic account of the sufferings of the martyrs and made 
numerous and direct references to the political level, serving as a detailed account of the events 
that had led to civil strife.25
Chandieu refuted the Catholic charges of treason and sedition against the king through refer-
ences to particular incidents involving the Parisian Calvinist community. As to the charge of 
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sedition, Chandieu reminded his readers that the Calvinists had previously fought against the 
Anabaptists and other radical elements and stressed Huguenot loyalty to the crown, as propa-
gated in the public sermons of ministers.26 
At the same time, he stressed that the Huguenots attributed the highest authority to God; free-
dom of religious conscience for them thus constituted a God-ordained mission.27 On the other 
hand, Chandieu invoked the failed meeting of Poissy, where the Catholic side had admitted to 
a series of doctrinal errors and he condemned “France’s captivity by the papacy” as the source 
of disaster for the country. In a particularly “revelational” passage, the Parisian minister recited 
catastrophes and hardships inflicted on France as a result of divine wrath for the persecution 
of Protestants: the military disaster of Saint-Quentin and the “mysterious death” of two kings, 
Henry II and Francis II, were presented as miraculous divine intervention on the side of the 
Huguenots.28
The polemical discourse of the Lyonese printed production of the years 1562–1565 revealed the 
biblical certainty for the triumph of “the soldiers of the Lord” against the “popish forces”.29 As “the 
dark night flees before the sharpness of the day ... the word of the Gospel dispersed like a strong 
wing the fog”.30 The militant “Church of the Lord” unfolded the “banner of truth”, beat “the drum of 
His Gospel”; “Jesus Christ had taken arms for the salvation of the French motherland”.31
The “community of the inhabitants of Lyon” demanded the immediate convocation of the as-
sembly of the Three Estates for the proper guidance of the juvenile monarch, the cessation of all 
persecution and the cleansing of French society through the punishment of the “blasphemous”; 
lastly, the confiscation of the property of “the priests of the Romans” for the “common weal”.32 
Another Lyonese tract of 1563, the La Défense civile et militaire des innocents et de l’Eglise de 
Christ, went even further, by offering scriptural foundations to the Protestant right to armed 
resistance against the “tyrant” king. The inflammatory content of the tract clearly clashed with 
the promoted loyalty of the Huguenot armed mobilisation, something that led to its condemna-
tion by a joint session of the ministers and the consistory of Lyon33 and the public burning of all 
copies in the city on 12 June 1563. By subjugating worldly reality to the pronouncements of a 
divinely inspired plan, these texts revealed the radical dynamics of a movement on a course of 
direct confrontation with the Catholic majority and the monarchy.34
Olivier Christin has recently pointed to the obvious paradox of the sixteenth century, when theo-
logical meetings organised by secular authorities with the aim of overcoming the religious divide 
not only ended up in total failure but, furthermore, contributed to a further hardening of theologi-
cal lines and to the crystallisation of solid doctrines, immune to the possibility of a compromise 
with the other side.35 In a way reminiscent of public disputations between Christians and Jews 
in the late middle Ages organised by Christian authorities as theatrical demonstrations of the 
superiority of Christian religion, meetings between “professionals of the doctrine”, such as at 
Poissy, actually served as accelerators of war, by demonstrating to the European elites that this 
was the only viable solution to the religious impasse. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:44:14 |
138
Religious Zeal and Political Expendiency HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 6 (2006)
139
Confessional wars between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth century were both viewed 
and legitimised as religious wars; Charles V’s Schmalkaldic War against German Protestants 
was promoted as a religious war but not as a “crusade”, despite its sanctioning by Catholic 
theologians such as Giovanni del Monte.36 Yet, the crusading spirit re-emerged triumphant in the 
French religious wars, fought between “God’s warriors” on both camps. Protestant iconoclasm, 
attacks on the sacraments and ritual of the Catholic Church, as well organised acts of violence 
against Catholics, were all part of a crusade for the purification of French society from the blas-
phemies and the tyranny of the Roman Church and for the establishment of a new society of the 
godly, serving God’s truth. On the other hand, Catholic ritualised violence reflected the belief that 
the heretics not only constituted a mortal threat to the political and moral order, but exposed 
societies who were willing to tolerate their infectious presence to the wrath of God.37
The failure of the Colloquy of Poissy did not constitute the major event that led to the wars of re-
ligion in France; it did not even discourage Catherine de Medici from persisting with her doomed 
policy of forced religious co-existence. Yet, the outbreak of hostilities, as well as the impressive 
duration of warfare, due to the increasingly obvious inability of the belligerents to permanently 
resolve the religious question in France, attest to the fact that, politics aside, “the conviction that 
human armies could literally fight God’s war was not to be easily uprooted from the European 
consciousness”.38
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